Re D (Contact: Interim Order)  1 FLR 495
In the case Re D (Interim Contact), and on the question of interim contact, Lord Justice Wall set out that in cases where the principle of contact was at issue, an interim contact order could be made if:
Re M (Interim Contact: Domestic Violence)  2 FLR 377
If there is a clear possibility that the court may order no contact at a final hearing (due to there being serious allegations made against you that you pose a risk of harm to the children), it is unlikely for an interim contact order to be made without oral evidence having been heard, or there having been some investigation by CAFCASS.
Re M (Contact: Restrictive Order: Supervision)  1 FLR 721
´A decision to require supervision of contact must be supported by evidence.´
AR (A Child: Relocation)  EWHC 1346 (Fam)
"On the facts of this case it is clear to me that supervised contact would only have been appropriate if there was the clearest and most compelling evidence that in some way S's best interests would be jeopardised by unsupervised, normal contact. Given the terms of the Strasbourg jurisprudence to which I have referred, it is almost as if there is a presumption in favour of normal contact and it is for those who say it is inappropriate to prove by clear evidence why this is so."
By Strasbourg jurisprudence, Mostyn J refers to the European Convention on Human Rights, and specifically, the right to family life. He goes on to say:
If one were to draw up a hierarchy of human rights protected by the Convention I would have thought that very near to the top would be the right of a child, while he or she is growing up, to have a meaningful participation by both of his parents in his upbringing. Although this is (strangely) not explicitly spelt out in the text it must be implicit in the notion of the right to a family life.